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1. The question this report addresses is how, in a globalised world, data subjects can be 
made aware of their rights and responsibilities and contribute to their own protection. 
 
The question itself raises a number of issues to be considered at the outset. 
 
2. Those who defend privacy are concerned about globalisation.  The new networks are 
removing the world's frontiers.  My curriculum vitae on the Internet is accessible from the 
four corners of the planet.  The visible or invisible trail left by my computer is transmitted 
over different networks and may be identified and processed in innumerable locations, near 
and distant, of which I may or may not be aware.   
 
Globalisation creates new dangers, and makes it difficult to establish confidence in distant 
sites that are sometimes barely identifiable and subject to little or no regulation. 
 
It also equates with the omnipresence and increasing multifunctionality of networks and 
communication services.  The list of networks - G.P.S/RFID/GSM/Wifi/BlueTooth/GRPS/SMS 
– continues to grow, as does their capacity and interoperability.  More and more products are 
fitted with microchips connecting them to networks and more and more human activities have 
access to these networks.  Read a newspaper, pay a supplier, place a small ad, open one's 
garage, look for a job or information or simply a street, chat with friends, order a book or a 
travel ticket, select a film ... barely a single activity falls outside the growing reach of 
information and communication technologies, in their globalised form. 
 
3. The question suggests two ways of tackling the issue: greater awareness and 
empowerment. 
 
Those who put the question not only want to improve data subjects' passive situation by 
making them better informed and educated and more aware of their rights but are also seeking 
means by which those concerned can protect themselves. 
 
Both approaches can be easily justified. 
 
Greater awareness is made necessary by the growing power of computers and networks, 
which is greatly increasing the potential, qualitative and quantitative, for processing data.  
Moreover data subjects are generating an ever wider and richer range of data through their use 
of networks.  Finally, and above all, the data that is processed is becoming increasingly 
difficult to identify or even spot. 
 
Add to this the growing sense among numerous users that they are losing control of their 
terminal equipment, that is of the object that allows them to connect up to and use the 
network.  Terminal equipment is broadly defined to include any product or component of a 
product connected directly or indirectly by any means whatsoever to interfaces of public 
telecommunications networks1.  Although fixed and mobile telephones and PCs come 
spontaneously to mind, there are also cards and card readers, Radio Frequency Identifiers 
(RFIDs) and all the telemetric systems for the remote identification of persons or relating 
objects to identifiable individuals.  Referring to these terminals, Dinant2 speaks of a "change 
                                                 
1 Directive 1999/5/EC on radio equipment and telecommunications terminal equipment. 
2 J. M. Dinant, draft report on the application of data protection principles to global telecommunications 
networks, Consultative Committee of the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data, Provisional Document, Strasbourg, 20th meeting, 28-30 June 2004. 
in the social paradigm".  He continues: "Telecommunications devices still involve a cause-
effect relationship but this is no longer dictated by the user but rather by the equipment 
designer. In other words, pressing a key no longer brings about an almost mechanical change 
in the state of the device, a change that, moreover, can generally be perceived (for example, 
taking the receiver off the hook and hearing the dialling tone or receiving a call and setting off 
the ringing tone) but constitutes a command to a computer programme that can do what the 
user wants autonomously, according to whether and how the programmer has so decided. 
Moreover, this action is in general partly invisible to the naked eye."3. 
 
It is not only terminals that resemble black boxes.  The same applies to the vast information 
and communication systems run by large government departments and private companies.  
Information is no longer seen in terms of one or two static purposes but as material that can be 
infinitely recycled within evolving systems to satisfy needs that cannot be identified at the 
outset or that cannot be satisfied.  These wide-ranging information systems see personal data 
increasingly as items at the disposal of many users for purposes not defined in advance.  For 
example, data on medical prescriptions on health cards may be available for subsequent use to 
monitor prescribers, to compile public health statistics, to assist reimbursement, for use in 
emergencies and so on. 
 
4. This raises the second issue of why we should focus on data subjects' active role and 
make them responsible for their own protection. 
 
As well as multiplying the data generated by data subjects, network interaction gives the latter 
more opportunity to negotiate the protection of their data, by restricting the uses to which they 
can be put and the number of users. 
 
This leads on to so-called "privacy enhancing technologies"4, which in various forms create a 
sense of user empowerment5 and try to re-establish a certain balance between data collectors 
and data subjects. 
 
The result is that from the standpoint of awareness raising and own initiatives data subjects 
have both rights and obligations.  They are entitled to data protection but at the same time 
have a duty to behave in a way that limits the risk that the data will be misused. 
 
Such an approach, which requires data subjects to contribute to their own protection, is one of 
the underlying themes of the Council of Europe Recommendation on the protection of 
Internet data6. 
 
The problem is that data subjects are in a similar situation to consumers, that is in an 
economically and technologically weak position.  To respond to this, regulations are designed 
                                                 
3 A good example of this user's malaise is provided by cookies, which chat away to each other quite outside the 
net surfer's control. 
4 Term first used in August 1995 in the joint report of the Ontario Information and Privacy Commission and the 
Netherlands Registratiekamer, The Path to Anonymity, Achtergrondstudies en Verkenningen 11, The Hague, 2 
volumes, 2nd ed., 1998. 
5 See also the application of this concept to information and communication systems and freedom of expression 
in M. d’ Udekem-Gevers and Y. Poullet, Internet Content Regulation - Concerns from an European User 
Empowerment Perspective, 17 CL&SR 2001, p. 371 and ff., 18 CL&SR 2002, p.11 and ff 
6 Though in a very qualified manner: see Recommendation No R (99) 5 for the protection of privacy on the 
Internet, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 23 February 1999: "Use of the Internet places 
responsibilities on each of your actions and poses risks to privacy. It is important to behave in a way that 
provides protection to yourself and promotes good relations with others." 
to protect the weaker party, the data subject, against the stronger, the data file controller, on 
whom it imposes certain responsibilities and obligations.  Admittedly it is possible to imagine 
that at some time in the future certain legal obligations might also be imposed on data subjects 
to limit the risks to themselves, but this implies that file controllers will also comply fully 
with the relevant regulations.  To take an example from another field, wearing seatbelts was 
only made compulsory for drivers after manufacturers had been required to fit them in their 
cars.  We will return to this illustration7.   
 
5. The original question, as currently phrased, offers an insight into the questioner's 
hopes as well as fears.  It suggests that internetworking and other technological solutions can 
enable data subjects to accept responsibility for protecting themselves against the new threats 
to privacy from the globalisation, opacity and increasing capacity of networks. 
 
6. To answer the question, we must first describe the contributions that each form of 
regulation can make.  We will consider firstly (section I) the relative merits of public regulation, 
self-regulation and technology, before concluding that joint regulation is what is required. 
 
Section II looks at the need for new principles on which to base new regulations, to take 
account of the changed context.  Efforts to make data subjects more aware of modern 
information systems and accept responsibility for their response seem to have taken on a new 
dimension, which calls for new forms of regulation, irrespective of their source. 
 
Finally section III looks at the contribution that each component of the information society 
can make to achieving a solution.  Traditionally, privacy legislation has been confined to three 
parties: data controllers, data subjects and those responsible for monitoring and balancing the 
interests of the two protagonists, the public data protection authorities as defined in data 
protection legislation8. 
 
Recent legislation and regulations reveal the appearance of new parties with perhaps an even 
more decisive role, namely consumers' associations and suppliers of telecommunications services, 
particularly network access suppliers and, above all, manufacturers of terminal equipment. 
 
Section I: Three forms of regulation to inform and empower information and 
communication service users: legislation, self-regulation and technology – a plea for 
joint regulation 
 
7. This section will not look in detail at the three forms of regulation traditionally 
associated with data protection: legislation, self-regulation and technology9.  We are simply 
concerned with how the three approaches can help, first separately then in combination, to 
make data subjects better informed about their rights and better able to exercise them. 
 
                                                 
7 … for which we are grateful to our colleague Jean Marc Dinant. 
8 The Council of Europe only recognised the importance of the third party very recently, with the opening for 
signature in November 2001 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with 
regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, regarding supervisory authorities and transborder data flows.  
The protocol "aims to enforce the effective protection of the individual by requiring the Parties to create one or 
more supervisory authorities that contribute to the protection of the individual’s rights and freedoms with regard 
to the processing of personal data". 
9 For more information, see in particular J. Reidenberg, Privacy Protection and the Interdependence of Law, 
Technology and Self-regulation, in Variations sur le droit de la société de l’information, Cahier du Crid, n° 20, 
Bruylant Brussels, 2002, p. 126 and ff.;  C.J. Bennett and C.D. Raab, The Governance of Privacy, Ashgate, 
2003, p. 12 and f. 
A. The law 
 
8. In accordance with Article 8 of Convention No. 108 (Protection of Individuals with 
regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data), our data protection legislation grants 
certain rights to data subjects.  These rights offer them a certain control over the image of 
them that can be presented.  Examples include the right to be informed of the existence of a 
file, the right of access and the right of rectification or erasure. 
 
Modern legislation has tended to expand these rights in line with the growing complexity of 
information systems.  In particular, since European Directive 95/46/EC10, access to data is no 
longer seen purely in terms of their content but also of their origin and, above all, the logic 
involved in their automatic processing.  The directive also grants data subjects the right not to 
be subject to decisions based on automated processing, making it necessary to enter into 
dialogue with the individuals concerned.  More recently,  Directive 2002/58/EC11 has required 
consent for electronic communications for "direct marketing purposes". 
 
This extension is not confined to new rights for data subjects but also entails new obligations 
for data controllers.  This is illustrated by the recent California Online Privacy Protection Act 
(OPPA)12, which requires all Web service suppliers who collect data to establish a Web page 
including certain information13. 
 
9. Although these new rights have been enshrined in legislation, their application remains 
limited, if not non-existent.  According to two Eurobarometer polls14 published by the 
European Commission in 2003, 49% of firms said that they had received fewer than 10 
requests for access in 2000 and 25% said they had had none.  The authors of the report on 
companies' perceptions of data protection legislation conclude that compliance with the law is 
not a priority since companies receive very few complaints. 
 
This is probably due to data subjects' limited knowledge of the data protection issue and its 
ramifications (70% of Europeans considered that awareness of personal data protection was 
low) and of existing data protection legislation (only 32% had heard of the right of access to 
and correction and erasure of data15).  We believe that another factor is the relative confidence 
European citizens have in the measures introduced by their countries, even if they are 
unaware of their content.  In other words government intervention has the perverse effect of 
making those who should be the first persons concerned – data subjects – feel less personally 
responsible for their own protection. 
 
                                                 
10 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data, Official Journal L 281 , 23/11/1995, P. 0031 – 0050. 
11 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector, Official 
Journal, 23/11/1995, L 201 P. 0037 – 0047. 
12 Enacted in 2003 and in force since 1 July 2004.  It adds new sections (22575-22579) to the Californian 
Business and Professions Code. 
13 In particular, in addition to information traditionally required by legislation (data controller's identity, types of 
data collected, purposes for which used), it also requires information tailored more closely to the ephemeral 
nature of Web sites, such as modification procedures and the date of the Privacy Policy. 
14 See the two Eurobarometer surveys published by the Internal Market Directorate and available on 
http://europa.eu.int/commm/internal_market/privacy.  The first (Special Eurobarometer 196, September 2003 ) 
focuses on the views of European citizens, the second (Flash Eurobarometer 147, September 2003), on those of 
businesses. 
15 And only 7% had used this right of access. 
Moreover, ordinary citizens or even their lawyers are likely to be discouraged by the abstract 
and excessively general wording of data protection legislation.  How is someone to interpret 
abstruse provisions such as one forbidding data controllers from processing data if this is 
incompatible with the purpose for which the data were initially collected, when he has just 
received an email from his bank telling him that his accident insurance premium has to go up 
because of the additional risks arising from his recent job loss or his poor stock market 
investments, or that he should consider taking out a cheaper insurance with them than with a 
competitor, whose existence has been highlighted by a bank transfer?  Many members of the 
public find it ironic that legislation to enable them to protect themselves and control their 
environment is too difficult to understand. 
 




11. Self-regulation as an alternative to public regulation may be a tempting prospect.  
Privacy policies, in the form of simple commitments, codes of practice and privacy 
standards16, drawn up by the industry itself, either alone or under supervision, as in the case of 
the "Safe Harbour Principles"17, are flourishing.  The advantage for data subjects is that they 
offer principles that are adapted to the particular circumstances of a company or sector, in a 
language that is much easier to understand than formal legislation. 
 
The criticisms of self-regulation are well known.  The first concerns the absence of safeguards 
regarding the effectiveness of this form of regulation.  A distinction needs to be drawn here 
between the different types of self-regulation.  Privacy commitments are undertakings by 
individual companies.  Privacy codes of practice are laid down at more collective levels, such 
as an industrial sector.  Individual firms accept the principles, and in the event of non-
compliance any sanctions that may be imposed by the association that drew up the code.  
Finally, standards involve an assessment procedure for determining whether those that agree 
to abide by them do in fact do so.  Such a procedure may take the form of certification18 that 
data protection conforms with the agreed principles and the awarding of a label19.  More 
general standards subject to checks and audits may also be developed20. 
 
Remedies against non-compliance may be improved by setting up alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) machinery21 that is readily accessible, has clearly identifiable powers and is 
capable of producing appropriate and constructive solutions. 
                                                 
16 On the difference between these forms of self-regulation see C.J. Bennett and C.D. Raab, The Governance of 
Privacy, Ashgate, 2003, p. 12 ff. 
17 See Commission Decision 2000/520/EC of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of protection provided by the safe harbour privacy principles and 
related frequently asked questions issued by the US Department of Commerce (OJ L 215 of 25.8.2000).  The 
Principles have been negotiated with the US government and declarations of compliance are published on the 
Department of Commerce official site.  For the Principles as a means of joint regulation, see Y. Poullet, Les Safe 
Harbor Principles; Une protection adéquate, on  http://www.droit-technologie.org.  
18 For example, by Trust-e, BBB Online, Privacy Programme and Webtrust. 
19 See J.R. Reidenberg, Adapting Labels and Filters for Data Protection, Cybernews, 1997, III, 6. 
20 Examples include the Canadian Model Code for the Protection of Personal Information, approved by the 
Standards Council of Canada in March 1996. More recently there have been discussions in the ISO. 
21 For more on ADR and its application to personal data protection, see ***.  The Safe Harbor Principles make 
the establishment of ADR a key element of the enforcement system.  "Effective privacy protection must include 
mechanisms for assuring compliance with the Principles, recourse for individuals to whom the data relate 
affected by non-compliance with the Principles, and consequences for the organization when the Principles are 
 
This means that complaints of lack of effectiveness may be valid for "weak" forms of self-
regulation but need to be substantially qualified for its more advanced forms.  However, the 
growing number of labels, whose scope and sometimes content is becoming increasingly 
difficult to assess, is certainly open to criticism.  Uncontrolled self-regulation means that data 
subjects must themselves decide on its value22. 
 
12. A second criticism concerns the risks posed by the "voluntary" nature of self-
regulation.  It might be argued that where undertakings are non-existent or do not add up to 
very much, data subjects will opt for competing firms that have accepted more binding self-
regulation that offers greater protection.  Such an argument holds little water when it is 
recognised that in practice the choice does not exist and that in any case privacy protection is 
hardly a key criterion in determining which firm an individual will choose. 
 
A third criticism relates to the nature of the protection offered.  Standards are often weak 
because they are drawn up exclusively by data controllers, who are anxious not to add too 
much to their existing burdens. 
 
C. Technological solutions 
 
13. So-called Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs)23 are increasingly being cited as 
data protection tools, either as a back-up to self-regulatory approaches such as P3P24 or as a 
substitute for other forms of regulation, like encryption25.  
 
Such approaches might be applied to the infrastructure, such as the automatic blocking of 
connections to countries that fail to comply with data protection rules, to data controllers, to 
intermediaries, such as the use of filters by special servers to block spam sent by certain types 
of enterprise, or to data subjects' terminals, such as tools to prevent the sending and receiving 
of cookies or to negotiate with the data controller. 
 
14. Critics of such tools, whose effectiveness is acknowledged26, focus on the rules that 
apply.  These rules are often agreed by experts who are not very aware of data protection 
requirements or are more sensitive to the needs of their industry than to data subjects' 
interests.  When the technologies concerned have to be applied by data subjects themselves, 
the notion of user empowerment is often something of a myth.  How can individuals take 
                                                                                                                                                        
not followed. At a minimum, such mechanisms must include (a) readily available and affordable independent 
recourse mechanisms by which each individual's complaints and disputes are investigated and resolved ...." 
22 See D.J. Solové, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 Stanford 
Law Review ( 2001), 1393 ff. 
23 H. Burkert, Privacy Enhancing Technologies Typology, Critique, Vision, in P. Agre and M Rotenberg (eds), 
Technology and Privacy, MIT Press, Cambridge, Ma., p. 125-143; L. Lessig, Code and Other Laws of 
Cyberspace, Basic Books, New York, 1999, p. 26 and ff; J. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: the Formulation of 
Information Policy through Technology, 76 Texas Law Rev., 1998, 552-593, Y. Poullet, Technology and Law: 
from Challenge To Alliance, Information Quality Regulation: Foundations, Perspectives and Applications, U. 
Gasser (ed.), Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2004,  For a presentation of PETs, see the EPIC site: 
http://www/epic.org/privacy/tools.html. 
24 See J. Catlett, Technical Standards and Privacy: An open letter to P3P developers; on: 
http://www.junkblusters.com/standards.html. 
25   On the various encryption protocols and anonymous proxy servers as well as anonymisation tools and the use 
of pseudonyms, see C.J.Bennett and C.D. Raab, op. cit.,  p. 148 ff.   
26 See, for example,  the conclusions of the PISA project, to which we will return (paragraph ...):  "Privacy is 
probably more effective if transactions are performed by means of technologies that are privacy enhancing 
…rather than relying on legal protection and self-regulation." ( http://dbs.cordis.lu/fep) 
responsibility for their own protection when the consequences of their decisions are not clear 
and they sometimes have no choice in the matter?  For example, there are sites that refuse 
access to users who do not accept cookies.  Negotiations via P3P may be insidiously bypassed 
by data controllers who offer to "pay" for personal data.  As Dix notes27: “Technology is 
however no panacea for privacy risks in cyberspace; it cannot replace a regulatory framework or 
legislation, contracts or code of conduct.  Rather it may only operate within such a framework.  
Privacy by negotiation is therefore no alternative to regulation but a necessary additional tool”. 
 
D. Amalgamating the three forms of regulation 
 
15. Probably the best way of improving data subjects' protection and raising their 
awareness is to draw on and link up all three forms of regulation28.  Privacy policies provide a 
good illustration.  A legal obligation to publish a Web page on data protection practice that is 
properly observed by the company concerned, accessible to users and fully compliant with the 
legislation in fact requires the use of a number of tools that are not themselves necessarily 
prescribed in the regulations.  Whether or not the company is meeting its legal obligations in 
practice may be the responsibility of particular certifying bodies or auditors29, who will then issue 
it with a form of certification or "trustmark".  Industry sectors may themselves propose privacy 
policy models, to avoid too great a diversity of formats, forms or expression and terminology.  
Where these do not exist, the law must intervene to settle the various points at issue30. 
 
Computer applications will be used to guarantee that the privacy policy is fully transparent by 
automatically opening the relevant Web page and, where appropriate, authorising an expert 
system to compare data subjects' privacy preferences with the options offered by the data 
controller and outlined in the privacy policy. 
 
16. The regulation of Web site privacy certification procedures provides another obvious 
example31.  The growing number of certification arrangements is very confusing for Internet 
users.  How much value can be attached to a seal of approval that can be copied and has been 
issued in a far-off location by an unknown body whose independence is less than obvious, whose 
ability to monitor sites effectively is dubious and whose power of sanction for non-compliance 
with certification rules is extremely limited?  One response may be for government to establish or 
initiate a certification system for certifiers, operated by a public authority or a body made up of 
acknowledged independent figures representing a range of interests32. 
 
To summarise, it seems clear that what is needed is a mixed system of joint regulation33 
where the law is backed up and given full effect by technical and self-regulation 
arrangements, which it should actively promote. 
 
                                                 
27 A. Dix , Infomediaries and Negotiated Privacy Techniques, paper presented to the conference "Computers, 
Freedom and Privacy" (CPF 2000), 19 April, Toronto, on  http://portal.acm.org/citation. 
28 See J.R. Reidenberg, Privacy Protection and the Interdependence of Law, Technology and Self-Regulation, in 
Variations sur le droit de la société de l’information, Cahier du Crid, No. 20, Bruylant Brussels, 2002, p. 126 ff. 
29 Such bodies or auditors might themselves be subject to accreditation based on criteria laid down, or at least 
approved, by government.  The TrustUK trustmark offers an interesting  example. 
30 For example, eight US federal regulatory institutions have established the Advanced Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking  (ANPR) procedure seeking public comment on ways to improve financial institution privacy 
notices required by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. 
31 On the regulation of certification, see the recommendations of the E-confidence Forum on http://www.jrc.it 
32 One example of such a system to ensure that Web sites satisfy the requirements of consumer protection and 
privacy legislation is the TrustUK trustmark system.  See R. de Bruin (uncompleted). 
33 See Y. Poullet, Technologies de l’information et de la communication et « co-régulation », une nouvelle 
approche? , in Mélanges Coipel, Kluwer, not yet published. 
Section II: New principles to encourage awareness and personal responsibility  
 
17. Those features that are most characteristic of the electronic communications service 
environment – growing presence and multifunctionality of electronic communications 
networks and terminals, their interactivity, the international character of networks, services 
and equipment producers and the absence of transparency in terminal and network 
functioning – all increase the risk of infringing individual liberties and human dignity. 
 
To counter these risks, certain new principles must be established if data subjects are to be 
better protected and have more control over their environment.  Such control is essential if 
those concerned are to exercise effective responsibility for their own protection. 
 
This is a first attempt to outline such principles.  It is based on a range of material and we 
have tried to structure it around five main principles, since at this stage we prefer not to speak 
of new "rights" for data subjects. 
 
A. The principle of encryption and reversible anonymity 
 
18. The encryption of message offers protection against access to the content of 
communications.  The quality varies, as do encryption and de-encryption techniques.  Encryption 
software for installation on users' computers (S/MIME or Open PGP protocols) is now available 
at a reasonable price.  Meanwhile, given its ambiguity, the notion of anonymity should perhaps be 
clarified, and possible replaced by other terms such as "pseudonymity" or "non-identifiability".  
What is sought is often not absolute anonymity but rather the functional non-identifiability of the 
author of a message vis-à-vis certain persons34.  There are many non-binding documents35 
advocating citizens' "right" to anonymity when using new technological services.  
Recommendation No R (99) 536 of the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers states that 
"anonymous access to and use of services, and anonymous means of making payments, are the 
best protection of privacy". 
 
19. Those using modern communication techniques must be able to remain unidentifiable 
by service providers and other third parties intervening during the transmission of the 
message and by the recipient or recipients of the message, and should have free or reasonably 
priced access to the means of exercising this option37.  The availability of readily affordable 
encryption and anonymisation tools and services is a necessary condition for computer users' 
exercising personal responsibility. 
 
The anonymity or non-identifiability required is not absolute however.  Citizens' right to 
anonymity has to be set against the higher interests of the state, which may impose restrictions 
                                                 
34 See J. Grijpink and C. Priens, Digital Anonymity on the Internet, New Rules for Anonymous Electronic 
Transactions?, 17 CL&SR § ( 2001 ), p. 378 ff. 
35 See in particular S. Rodota, Beyond the E.U. Directive: Directions for the Future, in Privacy: New Risks and 
Opportunities, Y. Poullet,  C. de Terwangne and P. Turner ( ed.), Cahier du CRID, Kluwer, Antwerpen, n° 13, p. 211 ff. 
36 Guidelines for the protection of individuals with regard to the collection and processing of personal data on 
information highways, available on the Council of Europe site.  See also Recommendation 3/97 of the so-called 
Article 29 Group: Anonymity on the Internet, and the opinion of the Belgian privacy commission on electronic 
commerce (No. 34/2000 of 22 November 2000, available on the commission's site: http://www.privacy.fgov.be), 
which points out that there are ways of authenticating the senders of messages without necessarily requiring 
them to identify themselves. 
37 See the recommendation of the French national data processing commission that access to commercial sites 
should always be possible without prior identification (M Georges, Relevons les défis de la protection des 
données à caractère personnel: l’ Internet et la CNIL, in Commerce électronique- Marketing et vie privée, Paris, 
2000, p.71 and 72. 
if these are necessary "to safeguard national security, defence, public security, [and for] the 
prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences".  Striking a balance 
between the legitimate monitoring of offences and data protection may be possible through 
the use of "pseudo identities", which are allocated to individuals by specialist service 
providers who may be required to reveal a user's real identity, but only in circumstances and 
following procedures clearly laid down in law.  Other approaches might include the enforced 
regulation of terminal equipment, to prevent browser chattering, permit the creation of 
ephemeral addresses and differentiation of address data according to which third parties will 
have access to the traffic or localisation data, and the disappearance of global unique 
identifiers by the introduction of uniform address protocols. 
 
B. The principle of reciprocal benefits  
 
20. This principle would make it a statutory obligation, wherever possible, for those who 
use new technologies to develop their professional activities to accept certain additional 
requirements to re-establish the traditional balance between the parties concerned.  The 
justification is simple – if technology increases the capacity to accumulate, process and 
communicate information on others and facilitates transactions and administrative operations 
it is essential that it should also be configured and used to ensure that data subjects, whether 
as citizens or consumers, enjoy a proportionate benefit from these advances. 
 
Several recent provisions have drawn on the proportionality requirement to oblige those who 
use technologies to make them available for users to enforce their interests and rights.   
 
One example is European Directive 2001/31/EC (the "E-Commerce Directive"), which 
includes electronic anti-spamming provisions.  Similarly, Article 5.3 of Directive 2002/58/EC 
on privacy and electronic communications even includes the requirement that "... the use of 
electronic communications networks to store information or to gain access to information 
stored in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user is only allowed on condition that the 
subscriber or user concerned is provided with clear and comprehensive information ... and is 
offered the right to refuse such processing ....". 
 
Legislation of the Freedom of Information variety introduces a similar right to transparency 
vis-à-vis government by adding further information that the latter is obliged to supply.  A 
Swedish commission38 has recently recommended legislation that would entitle citizens to 
monitor their cases electronically from start to finish, including their archiving, and oblige the 
authorities to adopt a good public access structure, to make it easier for individuals to identify 
and locate specific documents.  There is even draft legislation that would make it possible, 
one way or another, to link any official documents on which decisions were based to other 
documents on the case.  In other words, a public service that has become more efficient 
thanks to new technology must also be more transparent and accessible to citizens.  Citizens' 
right of access extends beyond the documents directly concerning them to include the 
regulations on which a decision was based. 
 
21. It is even possible to imagine that certain of the rights associated with data protection, 
such as the right to information, the rights of access and rectification and the right of appeal, 
might soon be enforceable electronically.  Many applications could be proposed: 
                                                 
38 P. Seipel, Information System Quality as a Legal Concern, in Information Quality Regulation: Foundations, 
Perspectives and Applications, U.Gasser ( ed. ), Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2004, p. 248. See also the Swedish 
commission report by P. Seipel, Law and Information Technology: Swedish Views, Swedish Government 
Official Reports, SOU 2002, 112. 
 
- it should be possible to apply data subjects' right to information at any time through a 
simple click (or more generally a simple electronic and immediate action) offering 
access to a privacy policy, which should be as detailed and complete as the greatly 
reduced cost of electronic dissemination allows.  Such a step must be anonymous as 
far as the page server is concerned, to avoid any risk of creating files on "privacy 
concerned" users.  In addition, in the case of sites that have been awarded quality 
labels, it should be obligatory to provide a hyperlink from the label symbol to the site 
of the body that awarded the label.  The same would apply to the declaration of the file 
controller to the supervisory authority.  A hyperlink would be installed between an 
unavoidable page of any site processing personal data and that of the relevant 
supervisory authority.  Finally, consideration might be given to the automatic 
signalling of any site located in a country offering inadequate protection; 
 
- in the future, data subjects must be able to exercise their right of access using an 
electronic signature.  It would be obligatory to structure files so that the right of access 
was easy to apply.  Additional information, such as the origin of documents and a list 
of third parties to whom certain data had been supplied, should be systematically 
available.  As noted earlier39, increasingly, the personal data accumulated by the vast 
public and private networks are no longer collected for one or more clearly defined 
purposes but are stored in the network for future uses that only emerge as new processing 
opportunities or previously unidentified needs arise.  In such circumstances, data subjects 
must have access to documentation describing the data flows within the network, the data 
concerned and the various users – a sort of data registry40; 
 
- it should be possible to exercise the rights of rectification and/or challenge on line to an 
authority with a clearly defined status responsible for considering or maintaining a list of 
complaints; 
 
- the right of appeal should also benefit from the possibility of on-line referral, exchange of 
parties' submissions and other documentation, decisions and mediation proposals. 
 
C. The principle of encouraging technological approaches compatible with or 
improving the situation of legally protected persons 
 
22. Recommendation 1/99 of the so-called Article 29 Group (the EU Data Protection 
Working Party)41, which is concerned with the threat to privacy posed by Internet 
communications software and hardware, establishes the principle that software and hardware 
industry products should provide the necessary tools to comply with European data protection 
rules.  In accordance with this third principle, regulators should be granted various powers. 
 
23. For example, they should be able to intervene in response to technological developments 
presenting major risks.  The so-called precautionary principle, which is well established in 
environmental law, could also apply to data protection. 
                                                 
39 See paragraph 3. 
40 This idea is the subject of two recent Belgian laws that require the establishment of sectoral committees for the 
networks linked to the National Register (Act of 8 August 1983 establishing a national register of persons, as 
amended by the Act of 25 March 2003, MB. 28 March 2003, art.12§1) and to the commercial registration 
authority (Banque Carrefour des entreprises) (Act of 16 January 2003 establishing the authority, MB. 5 
February. 2003, article 19§4 ). 
41 Recommendation on Invisible and Automatic Processing of Personal Data on the Internet Performed by 
Software and Hardware. 
 
This can be illustrated by one of the provisions of the EU Directive on privacy and electronic 
communications.  Article 14 states that where required, the Commission may adopt measures 
to ensure that terminal equipment is compatible with data protection rules.    In other words, 
standardising terminal equipment is another, admittedly subsidiary, way of protecting 
personal data from the risks of unlawful processing – risks that have been created by all these 
new technological options.  Going further, it is necessary to prohibit so-called privacy killing 
strategies42, in accordance with the security principle enshrined in Article 7 of Council of 
Europe Convention 108.  The obligation to introduce appropriate technical and organisational 
measures to counter threats to data privacy will require site managers to make sure that 
messages exchanged remain confidential, indicate clearly what data is being transmitted, 
whether automatically or by hyperlink, as is the case with cybermarketing companies, and 
make it easy to block such transmission. 
 
This security obligation will also require those who process personal data to opt for the most 
appropriate technology for minimising or reducing the threat to privacy.  This requirement 
clearly has an influence on the design of smart cards, particularly multifunctional cards43, 
such as identity cards. 
 
Another example of the application of this principle concerns the structuring of medical files 
at various levels, as recommended by the Council of Europe. 
 
24. It might be possible to go further by recommending the development of privacy 
enhancing technologies, that is tools or systems that take more account of data subjects' rights.  
Clearly, the development of these technologies will depend on the free play of the market but 
the state must play an active part in encouraging privacy compliant and privacy enhancing 
products by subsidising their research and development, establishing equivalent voluntary 
certification and accreditation systems and publicising their quality labels, and ensuring that 
products considered necessary for data protection are available at affordable prices. 
 
D. The principle of full user control of terminal equipment 
 
25. The justification for this principle is obvious.  Since these terminals can enable others to 
monitor our actions and behaviour, or simply locate us, they must function transparently and 
under our control.  Article 5.3 of Directive 2002/58/EC, cited above, offers a first illustration of 
this point.  Those concerned must be informed of any remote access to their terminals, via 
cookies, spyware or whatever, and be able to take easy and effective countermeasures, free of 
charge.  Directive 2002/58/EC also establishes the rule that users of calling and connected lines 
can prevent the presentation of the calling line identification. 
 
Going beyond these examples, we would also argue that all terminal equipment should be 
configured to ensure that owners and users are fully informed of any data flows entering and 
leaving, so that they can then take any appropriate action. 
 
Similarly, as is already the case under some legislation, possession of a smart card should be 
accompanied by the possibility of read access to the data stored on the card. 
                                                 
42 Expression used by J.M. Dinant, Law and Technology Convergence in the Data Protection Field, in E-
commerce Law and Practice in Europe, I. Walden and J. Horne, Woodhead Publishers Ld, Cambridge, 2002, 
Chapter 8.2 
43 On the privacy compliant design of multi-application cards, see E. Keuleers and J.M. Dinant, Multi-
application smart card schemes, 19, CL&SR, 4 2003, 480 and ss; 20, CL&SR, 1, 2004, 22 and ss. 
 
User control also means that individuals can decide to deactivate their terminals once for all, and 
at any time.  This is important as far as Radio Frequency Identifiers (RFIDs) are concerned.  Data 
subjects must be able to rely on third parties44 that vouch that such technical means of remote 
identification have been fully deactivated. 
 
26. Users may well apply this principle to firms that are not necessarily covered by 
traditional data protection rules because they are not responsible for data processing.  
Examples include suppliers of terminal equipment and many forms of browser software that 
can be incorporated into terminals to facilitate the reception, processing and transmission of 
electronic communications.  This point will be considered further in Section III. 
 
The principle also applies to public and private standard setting bodies concerned with the 
configuration of such material and equipment. 
 
The key point is that the products supplied to users should not be configured in such a way 
that they can be used, whether by third parties or the producers themselves, for illicit 
purposes.  This can be illustrated by a number of examples: 
 
- a comparison of browsers available on the market shows that chattering between them 
goes well beyond what is strictly necessary to establish communication; 
 
- browsers differ greatly in how they receive, eliminate and prevent the sending of 
cookies, which means that the opportunities for inappropriate processing will also vary from 
one browser to another; 
 
- attention should also be drawn to the use of unique identifiers and spyware by 
suppliers of browser tools and communication software. 
 
More generally, terminal equipment should function transparently so that users can have full 
control of data sent and received.  For example, they should be able to establish, without fuss, 
the precise extent of chattering on their computers, what files have been received, their 
purpose and who sent them. 
 
E. The principle that users of certain information systems should benefit from 
consumer protection legislation  
 
27. The routine use of information and communication technologies, formerly confined to 
major undertakings, and the rapid development of electronic commerce that has multiplied the 
number of on-line services have led to a more consumerist approach to privacy.  Web surfers 
increasingly view infringements of their privacy –spamming, profiling, differential charging 
policies, refusal of access to certain services and so on – from the standpoint of consumers of 
these new services. 
 
Thus, in the United States the first hesitant steps towards legislation on data protection in the 
private sector focussed on on-line consumer protection.  Reference has already been made to 
Californian legislation45 but we should also bear in mind the 1995 Consumer Privacy Act and, 
                                                 
44 Clearly this refers to accreditation arrangements such as those already described in paragraph 15 (joint 
regulation) or to approval issued by the authorities to certain undertakings (public regulation). 
45 See paragraph 12. 
more recently, the 2000 declaration of the Federal Trade Commission46, which emphasised the 
need for privacy legislation to protect on-line consumers.  In Europe as in America measures to 
combat spamming are concerned with both consumers' economic interests and data subjects' 
privacy. 
 
28. This convergence between consumers' economic interests and citizens' freedoms opens 
up interesting prospects.  It suggests that the right to resort to certain forms of collective 
action, which is already recognised in the consumer protection field, should be extended to 
privacy matters.  Such an entitlement to "class actions" is particularly relevant in an area 
where it is often difficult to assess the detriment suffered by data subjects and where the low 
level of damages awarded is a disincentive to individual actions. 
 
In addition, many other aspects of consumer law could usefully be applied to data protection.  
Examples are the obligations to provide information and advice, which could be imposed on 
operators offering services that essentially involve the management or supply of personal 
data, such as Internet access providers and personal database servers (case-law databases, 
search engines and so on), the law governing general contractual conditions (applicable to 
privacy policy) and measures to combat unfair commercial practices and competition. 
 
Finally, providing personal data as a condition of access to a site or an on-line service could 
be viewed not merely from the standpoint of data protection legislation – does the user's 
consent meet the necessary requirements and is it sufficient to legitimise the processing in 
question? – but also that of consumer law, if only in terms of unfair practices in obtaining 
consent or the major detriment arising from the imbalance between the value of the data 
secured and that of the services supplied. 
 
Another avenue to be explored is whether consumer product liability for terminals and software 
can be extended beyond any physical and financial harm caused to include infringements of data 
protection requirements.  How far is the supplier of browser software whose use leads to breaches 
of privacy objectively liable for data infringements by third parties? 
 
Part III: The role of traditional and new parties in making data subjects aware of their 
rights and capable of protecting themselves 
 
29. Much has been said about data subjects' obligations.  Thanks to information technologies 
these obligations have taken on a new dimension.  The key points are summarised in paragraph 
III.11 of Recommendation R (99) 5 of the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers on the 
protection of privacy on the Internet47: "You are responsible for proper use of data. On your 
introductory page highlight a clear statement about your privacy policy. This statement should 
be hyperlinked to a detailed explanation of your privacy practice. Before the user starts using 
services, when he or she visits your site, and whenever he or she asks, tell him or her who you 
are, what data you collect, process and store, in what way, for what purpose and for how long 
you keep them. If necessary, ask for his or her consent. At the request of the person 
concerned, correct inaccurate data immediately and delete them if they are excessive, out of 
date or no longer required and stop the processing carried out if the user objects to it. Notify 
the third parties to whom you have communicated the data of any modification. Avoid the 
hidden collection of data." 
                                                 
46 See the report to Congress "Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices" May 2000, available on the FTC site:  
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/index.htm.  In the United States, the FTC, which is very active in the consumer 
protection field, has played a key role in protecting citizens' privacy. 
47 Adopted on 23 February 1999. 
 
30. We will consider at somewhat greater length the duties of a second traditional party: 
the data protection authorities, who play a key role in enforcing data protection legislation, 
albeit one that was rather belatedly recognised by the Council of Europe48.    These authorities 
have a particular responsibility for assisting data subjects and promoting awareness of data 
protection rules among both data subjects and data controllers49. 
 
In Europe, this role is performed by independent administrative authorities.  Eurobarometer 
has already highlighted the minimal impact of these authorities, often characterised by 
excessive legalism and procedures rather than a genuinely active stance.  This is reflected in 
the criticisms levelled by Flaherty at an international conference of data protection 
commissioners: more than two-thirds of Europeans (68%) said that they were unaware of 
these authorities' existence and only 27% claimed to have heard references to them50. 
 
This is an alarming finding.  The failure of these authorities to attract media attention, even when 
relevant stories hit the headlines, is undoubtedly worth emphasising.  But a visit to their sites 
reveals other shortcomings.  Few of them are attractive51, and few of them allow complaints to be 
lodged on line52.  Only a few sites have opened discussion forums on particular themes, or have 
made the effort to present data protection laws in the form of frequently asked questions (FAQ)53.  
There is also a regrettable absence of links to university, professional, consumer, civil liberties 
and other sites offering more information54.  Nor, unfortunately, do these sites include 
descriptions of technological services and products offering effective protection55.  One 
explanation is probably a lack of financial resources, but this may not be the only reason. 
 
To summarise, authorities that are too inward looking need to look to other citizen protection 
groups with a view to offering and organising joint information and action. 
 
31. Responsibility for educating data subjects and data controllers cannot be limited to 
data protection authorities.  Civil liberties and consumer protection associations obviously 
have a part to play if the notion of collective remedies is accepted56, but so do other bodies.  
The first is identified in Article 4 of Directive 2002/58: "In case of a particular risk of a 
breach of the security of the network, the provider of a publicly available electronic 
communications service must inform the subscribers concerning such risk57 and, where the 
                                                 
48 See the Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data, regarding supervisory authorities and transborder data flows (ETS, No 181, 
Strasbourg 8 November 2001). 
49 These roles have been emphasised by the Article 29 Group, particularly in terms of what constitutes adequate 
protection (See Working Paper No. 12 of 24 July 1998: "Transfers of personal data to third countries: application 
of articles 25 and 26 of the Community directive on data protection"). 
50 Only in the Netherlands, Italy and Sweden had more than one inhabitant in three heard of this authority.  
Under the circumstances, the Quebec approach of appointing a journalist to head the access to information and 
data protection commission merits further consideration. 
51 The French CNIL site is an exception. 
52 In this regard, see the various models for lodging complaints proposed by the Federal Trade Commission. 
53 See in particular the Netherlands site: http://www.cbpweb.nl/documenten/faq_wbp_cbp.htm. and the British 
one: http:// www.informationcommission.gov.uk, which also offers a particularly well constructed video and CD 
Rom, though unfortunately this is not available on line.  The French site offers a demonstration of how Net users 
are identified when they visit a Web site. 
54 Probably an indication that our authorities are anxious not to appear to be giving priority to certain opinions or 
institutions. 
55 Something that is offered by EPIC (Electronic Privacy Information Centre), with hyperlinks such as 
http://www.epic.org. 
56 See paragraph 27. 
57 See paragraph III.2 of Council of Europe Recommendation No. R (99) 5. 
risk lies outside the scope of the measures to be taken by the service provider, of any possible 
remedies, including an indication of the likely costs involved." 
 
For example, Internet access providers and mobile and fixed telephone operators are given 
responsibility for informing the public about the risks attached to using their networks, for 
combating privacy killing technologies and, at the same time, for promoting appropriate 
privacy enhancing ones.  Access providers' role is critical, since they are the obligatory 
interface between users and the network.  They are therefore asked58 to "inform users about 
technical means which they may lawfully use to reduce security risks to data and 
communications", to "use appropriate procedures and available technologies, preferably those 
which have been certified, to protect the privacy of the people concerned , ....., especially by 
ensuring data integrity and confidentiality as well as physical and logical security of the 
network and of the services provided over the network", and to inform users "about the 
possibilities of using [Internet] services and paying for them in an anonymous way".  They 
should set up hotlines for subscribers to submit complaints about breaches of privacy and sign 
a code of conduct requiring them to block access to sites that fail to meet personal data 
requirements, irrespective of the site's location. 
 
32. Three other groups of participants in the process have already been mentioned.  First 
there are all the trusted intermediaries whose activities are in principle market governed.  
These are the infomediaries that act as the interface between data subjects and controllers and 
reassure data subjects that data protection requirements are being met through an accreditation 
and certification process and by offering anonymisation and filtering services and negotiating 
with data controllers.  Their activities deserve to be better known and should be encouraged 
by the authorities59. 
 
Then there are the manufacturers and developers of the hardware and software that make up 
the terminal equipment, as well as those responsible for the protocols and technical standards 
used to transmit information over the network.  They should ensure that the configuration of 
their products and their standards60: 
 
- meet legal requirements, for example by transmitting via Internet browsers the minimum 
information necessary for connection and by adopting appropriate safety standards; 
 
- permit the application of the principles identified in Part II, for example direct user 
access to his or her personal data or an automatic right of challenge; 
 
- improve the level of protection of personal data. 
 
33. Finally there is the state, which has a responsibility, according to the Council of 
Europe, for promoting its citizens' rights.  This means that it cannot confine itself to 
investigating and prosecuting abuses.  This points to certain conclusions: 
 
                                                 
58 Recommendation No. R (99) 5, paragraph III, 3, 1 and 4. 
59 For example, via research contracts to permit the development of new services and products.  PISA (Privacy 
Incorporated Software Agent), a project subsidised by the EU's fifth framework programme, offers a good 
example. For more on this programme, and a comparison of the PISA and P3P approaches (with the former 
aimed at re-establishing equality between data subjects and their Web sites) see    
http://www.tno.nl/instit/fel/pisa and Borking and Raab, Laws, PETS and other Technologies for Privacy 
Protection, JILT, 2001, p. 1 ff (also available on http://elj.werwick.ac.uk/filt/01-1/borking .html.) 
60 See Opinion No. 34/2000 of the Belgian Commission on data protection and electronic commerce. 
- educating and informing data subjects cannot just be left to the data protection authorities.  
When schools are instructing their pupils in the use of information and communication 
technologies they must also introduce them to the very principles of data protection; 
 
- data controllers should be made aware of their responsibilities through university and 
other training modules for data protection staff61, or more generally "security 
officials"62, in both government and business.  The aim is to make data protection a 
core element of government and business activity; 
 
- the state has a duty to promote new services and products to assist other forms of 
regulation and ensure that all those involved in regulation are properly co-ordinated.  
In the case of technological developments, it also has a duty of precaution. 
 
Whenever new technologies are introduced, particularly ones linked to the use of 
communication networks, their impact on fundamental liberties must be assessed.  Such 
technology assessments63 should be accompanied by public debates organised by the data 
protection authorities and might lead to decisions to suspend development.  Clearly, the state 
can only play such a role if it has an active presence in the normally purely private 
organisations where decisions on future technological developments are taken64. 
 
Finally, where the state is itself responsible for data processing, it must not only abide by its 
own regulations but also encourage approaches that strengthen data subjects' rights.  With the 
advent of e-government and one-stop services, it seems only natural to use existing network 
applications to offer citizens electronic access to their case files, information on where the 
data came from and who has had access to it, and an easy-to-understand description of the 
intra-governmental communication systems involved in dealing with their cases.  Government 
Web sites explaining the different administrative purposes for which data is processed and 
how the relevant information systems operate and hotlines for receiving complaints and 




In the introduction, I referred to the difficulties that the very title of this report presented.  The 
call for greater awareness and more responsibility in the hands of data subjects suggests that 
at a time of double globalisation65 of information and communication technologies data 
subjects' ability to control the use of information about them has significantly diminished. 
 
The challenge is posed by the "black box" represented by increasingly complex and "intelligent" 
terminals and transnational information systems with limitless processing capacity. 
 
By itself, the law offers limited opportunity for returning even a modicum of control to users.  
Citizens have little knowledge of the rights that the law so generously grants them but in 
                                                 
61 See the Belgian delegation's proposals to the conference of data protection commissioners in Buenos Aires. 
62 It cannot be stressed too often that data protection means much more than just ensuring the security of data.  
As well as maintaining data confidentiality, it is also concerned with the balance between data controllers' and 
data subjects' interests. 
63 See , D. Flaherty, Privacy Impact Assessments: An essential Tool for Data Protection, 7 PLPR (2000), p. 85 ff. 
64 We have in mind IETF, W3C and ICANN.  For more on these organisations, see P. Trudel (ed.), Droit du 
cyberespace, Montreal, Thémis, 1997; J. Berleur, Y. Poullet, Quelles régulations pour l’Internet, Gouvernance 
de la société de l’information, Cahier du CRID, n° 22, Bruylant, Brussels, p. 133 ff. 
65 Globalisation in the sense that networks are becoming increasingly international and are converging, but also 
because all our activities are gradually being digitally recorded. 
addition data controllers have little incentive to comply with legislation that is so rarely 
invoked.  This is not to criticise the law as such but it does mean that self-regulation and 
technological solutions are required to enforce and strengthen those rights.  The answer is 
joint regulation, in other words a fruitful dialogue between the various regulatory approaches. 
 
To repeat, the law is necessary.  It provides a framework for self-regulation and a yardstick by 
which the latter may be assessed and judged.  Besides, users cannot be simply abandoned, 
without knowing which form of regulation to trust.  The market can only be a good guide if it 
is transparent and "consumers" are capable of distinguishing data protection factors from 
other criteria.  The user empowerment that certain technologies offer will remain a myth if it 
is not subject to legal oversight. 
 
Joint regulation calls for new players who will help to raise awareness and offer users real 
opportunities to control their environment.  Examples are organisations that certify Web sites 
and other infomediaries.  Joint regulation should encourage the development of new "safe" 
technologies and make them available to both users and intermediaries such as Internet access 
providers.  Anonymisation software and services offer good illustrations. 
 
This latter point and the accompanying example reflect two of the new principles we are 
advocating.  What are the others?  For data subjects to exercise control over modern 
information systems' presentation of their image their terminals must operate totally 
transparently, the emphasis must be on information that is needed for specific purposes rather 
than to generate a multiple processing capacity and data must be properly documented – 
origin, users, justification and how and where it circulates. 
 
The purpose of these principles is to offer every individual all that is necessary for them to 
understand their computer environment, particularly within their own household.  They 
should have full control over tools whose use leaves them open to the gaze of others. 
 
If users are to acquire such control, they will need support from various quarters. We have 
argued strongly that data protection authorities should be more attentive to the public and 
offer them more user-friendly information.  The state has an educational role to play, towards 
both data controllers and data subjects, aimed at promoting new tools and new professional 
skills.  We also believe that as the necessary interface between data subjects and the Internet, 
access providers must provide information on the risks involved and ways of countering them.  
Finally, terminal equipment manufacturers clearly have responsibilities to meet. 
 
In this way we can make the information highway more secure, with properly signposted 
communications networks and traffic intersections, vehicles fitted with the necessary safety 
equipment and drivers who are fully aware of the risks involved and reliably equipped to 
avoid the dangers.  It only remains for these drivers to accept their responsibilities and take an 
active part in securing their own protection. 
